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IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES: PART II 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
This is the second of two articles on the impeachment 
of witnesses. 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
Ohio Evidence Rule 404(A) prohibits the use of charac-
ter evidence unless one of three enumerated exceptions 
applies. The third exception provides: "Evidence of the 
character of a witness on the issue of credibility is admis-
sible as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609." Possible 
means by which a witness' untruthful character might be 
shown are reputation evidence, opinion evidence, and 
evidence of specific instances of conduct. Rule 608(A) 
permits the use of reputation and opinion evidence. Rule 
608(8) permits the use of specific instances of conduct 
which did not result in conviction, so long as the 
evidence is clearly probative of untruthful character. Rule 
609 deals with the admissibility of prior convictions. 
OPINION AND REPUTATION EVIDENCE 
Rule 608(A) permits the use of opinion and reputation 
evidence to show a witness' character for untruthfulness. 
In this context, character is used circumstantially; a 
person with a poor character for truth and veracity is 
more likely to testify untruthfully than a person with a 
good character for truth and veracity. See also Rule 
803(20) (recognizing a hearsay exception for reputation 
evidence concerning character). 
impeachment under Rule 608 is limited to the charac-
ter trait of untruthfulness. See Staff Note ("only evidence 
relating to veracity is admissible."). This limitation is 
imposed in order "to sharpen relevancy, to reduce 
surprise, waste of time, and confusion, and to make the 
lot ofthe witness somewhat less unattractive." Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. Evid. R. 608. This aspect of Rule 
608 is consistent with prior Ohio law. In State v. Scott, 61 
Ohio St.2d 155, 400 N.E.2d 375 (1980), the Supreme 
Court held: "In impeaching the credibility of a witness, 
inquiry into general reputation or character should be 
restricted to reputation for truth and veracity." /d. (sylla-
bus, para. 3). Accord, Craig v. State, 5 Ohio St. 605 
(1854); State v. Agner, 30 Ohio App.2d 96, 283 N.E.2d 
ublic Defender Hyman Friedman 
443 (Hancock 1972); Schueler v. Lynam, 80 Ohio App. 
325, 75 N.E.2d 464 (Montgomery 1947). Thus, evidence 
of a witness' general moral character is inadmissible. 
See State v. Scott, 61 Ohio St.2d 155,400 N.E.2d 375 
(1980). 
It is the witness' character for truth and veracity at the 
time of trial that is relevant. "Evidence as to such general 
impeachment must relate to the time at which such 
witness testified, or reasonably near thereto." Radke v. 
State, 107 Ohio St. 399, 140 N.E. 586 (1923) (syllabus, 
para. 2). See.a/so Hamilton v. State, 34 Ohio St. 82 (1877) 
(reputation two years prior to trial admitted); McCormick, 
Evidence§ 44 (3d ed. 1984). 
The prior Ohio cases recognized the use of reputation 
evidence to show untruthful character. See State v. Scott, 
61 Ohio St.2d 155, 400 N.E.2d 375 (1980); Cowan v. 
Kinney, 33 Ohio St. 422 (1878); French v. Millard, 2 Ohio 
St. 44 (1853); Bucklin v. State, 20 Ohio 18 (1851}; State v. 
Rivers, 50 Ohio App_.2d 129, 361 N.E.2d 1363 (Cuyahoga 
1977}. In addition, a character witness may be asked if 
"from such reputation he would not believe the witness 
sought to be impeached under oath." Hillis v. Wylie, 26 
Ohio St. 574 (1875) (syllabus). See also State v. Agner, 30 
Ohio App.2d 96, 283 N.E.2d 443 (Hancock 1972). Under 
the case law, the use of opinion evidence was not permit-
ted. See Cowan v. Kinney, 3305 422 (1878); Bucklin v. 
State, 20 Ohio 18 (1851). Rule 608(A) however, changes 
the common law and permits the use of opinion 
evidence. 
Foundational requirements 
A foundation mustbe laid showing that the character 
witness is acquainted with the reputation of the principal 
witness before the character witness is permitted to state 
his opinion of that reputation. The Supreme Court 
described this foundational requirement in Radke v. 
State, 107 Ohio St. 399, 140 N.E. 586 (1923): 
[T]he impeaching witness must show on preliminary 
examination either that he has for some time lived in 
that community or done business in that community, or 
some other relation to that community that would quali-
fy him to speak as to the community's general opinion 
touching the reputation of the party sought to be 
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impeached. The preliminary qualifications of the 
impeaching witness must be such as to advise the 
court and the jury that he has the means of knowing 
such general reputation of the witness sought to be 
impeached in the community in which the witness 
lives. /d. (syllabus, para. 1). 
See also State v. Rivers, 50 Ohio App.2d 129,361 N.E.2d 
1363 (Cuyahoga 1977). The community in which reputa-
tion is based may be "any substantial community of 
people among whom [the principal witness] is well 
known, such as the group with whom he works, does 
business, or goes to school." McCormick, Evidence 103 
(3d ed. 1984). A similar foundation is required before a 
witness may express an opinion concerning the principal 
witness' character for truth and veracity. The inquiry, 
however, focuses on the character witness' relationship 
with the principal witness rather than on reputation in the 
community. 
PRIOR CONVICTIONS 
Rule 609 governs the admissibility of evidence of prior 
convictions offered for the purpose of impeachment. 
Rule 609 applies only when a prior conviction is offered 
to impeach a witness by showing character for untruthful-
ness. The admissibility of specific instances of conduct 
that have not resulted in a conviction is governed by Rule 
608(8), not Rule 609. If the evidence is offered under an 
impeachment theory other than character, Rule 609 does 
not apply. For example, evidence of a conviction may be 
admitted to show that the witness has received or expects 
to receive favorable treatment by the prosecution. Such 
evidence shows bias and is not governed by Rule 609. 
Moreover, evidence of prior conduct that has resulted in 
conviction may be admissible for reasons other than 
impeachment. for example, eyidence of ''otb.E:lJ crimes" 
may be admissible under Rule 404(8) as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, and so forth. 
When evidence of a prior conviction is admitted, a 
limiting instruction is required upon request of a party. 
See Rule 105; Ohio Jury Instructions§ 405.22. 
Policy 
Rule 609 deals with the impeachment use of character 
evidence. It recognizes that specific instances of conduct 
that have resulted in a conviction may be used to show 
untruthful character. The principal issue in drafting a 
provision such as HuiE:l {)09 i~ <;l~tE:lrmining .which crimes 
reflect untruthful character. For example, a prior convic-
tion for driving while intoxicated reveals very little about a 
person's character for truthfulness, although it may 
reveal other things about that person's character. 
Rule 609(A) limits the types of convictions that are 
admissible for the purpose of impeachment to (1) crimes 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one 
year and (2) crimes of dishonesty and false statement, 
regardless of punishment. These limitations were not 
recognized under prior Ohio law. For example, RC 
2945.42 provides that conviction of a crime "may be 
shown for the purpose of affecting the credibility of [a] 
witness." In State v. Murdock, 172 Ohio St. 221, 174 
N.E.2d 543 (1961), the Supreme Court interpreted that 
provision as permitting the admission in evidence of all 
prior convictions, including misdemeanors. The Court 
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also held, however, that an ordinanc.e violation was not a 
"crime" within the meaning of the statute. See State v. 
Arrington, 42 Ohio St.2d 114, 326 N.E.2d 667 (1975); 
Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481, 140 N.E. 364 (1922); 
Coble v. State, 31 Ohio St. 100 (1876). 
Thus, Rule 609(A) changed the prior law in two 1, 
respects. Most misdemeanors, admissible under prior 
law, are no longer admissible unless they involve crimes 
of dishonesty or false statement. Ordinance violations, 
however, which were excluded under prior law, are now 
admissible if they involve crimes of dishonesty or false 
statements. In addition, Rule 609(8) changes prior Ohio 
law by placing a time limitation on the use of prior convic-
tions. Generally, convictions over ten years old are inad-
missible under that provision. 
According to the Ohio Supreme Court, a prior convic-
tion in which pronouncement of sentence is still pending 
may be used for impeachment pursuant to Rule 609(A). 
State v. Cash; 40 Ohio St.3d 116 (1988). See also 3 
Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 323, at 373-74 
(1979). 
Appellate Review 
In Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 
L. Ed.2d 443 (1984), the defendant moved in limine to 
prevent the prosecution from using a prior conviction to 
impeach him. His motion was based on Federal Rule 
609(a). The trial court denied the motion but indicated 
that the nature of Luce's trial testimony might affect its 
ruling. Luce, however, did not testify at trial. He was con-
victed and appealed. 
On review, the Supreme Court ruled that Luce had 
failed to preserve the issue for appeal because he had ~. 
not testified at trial: "We hold that to raise and preserve 
for review the ch1im of improper impeachment with a 
prior conviction, a defendant must testify." /d. at 43. The 
Court set forth several reasons for its ruling. First, Feder-
al Rule 609(a) requires the trial court to balance the 
probative value of the prior conviction for impeachment 
purposes against its prejudicial effect. Such an evalua~ 
tion, in the Court's view, is impossible without knowing 
the precise nature of the defendant's testimony. Second, 
if the trial court's decision to admit the evidence is 
erroneous, an appellate court is handicapped in making 
the required harmless error determination without know-
ing the nature of the defendant's testimony. 
Crimes punishable by death or one year imprisonment 
Rule 609(A)(1) provides that evidence of prior convic-
tions involving crimes punishable by death or imprison-
ment in excess of one year is admissible for impeachment. 
Convictions adjudged under federal law as well as the 
laws of other states fall within the rule. The authorized 
maximum punishment, rather than the actual punish-
ment imposed, is determinative. 
The Ohio rule differs from Federal Rule 609(a)(1) in one 
important respect. The federal rule contains the addition-
al requirement that prior convictions falling within this 
category are admissible only if the "court determines that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs 
its prejudicial effect to the defendant." Thus, a federal 
court has discretion to exclude the evidence even if the 
prior conviction involves a crime punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year. 
In contrast, Ohio Rule 609(A) appears to provide that 
convictions falling within this category are automatically 
admissible. The deletion of the discretionary language 
contained in the federal rule supports this construction. 
The Staff Note, however, includes language that indi-
cates that a trial court retains discretion to exclude evidence 
of prior convictions that fall within this category. The Staff 
Note, after referring to the discretion recognized in the 
federal rule, states: "In limiting that discretionary grant, 
Rule 609(A) is directed to greater uniformity in applica-
tion subject only to the provisions of Rule 403. The 
removal of the reference to the defendant insures that the 
application of the rule is not limited to criminal prosecu-
tions." This passage suggests that the drafters were 
concerned not with eliminating discretion but rather with 
its uniform application. This reading is supported by the 
Staff Note citation of Rule 403, which provides that the 
exclusion of relevant evidence is mandatory if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the 
jury. See Blakey, A Short Introduction to the Ohio Rules of 
Evidence, 10 Capital L. Rev. 237,256-57 (1980). 
If the rule permits the trial court to exclude evidence of 
prior convictions, several factors should affect that deci-
sion. These factors·are drawn from Luck v. United States, 
348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965), and its progeny, which were 
concerned with the dilemma facing a criminal defendant 
who has a record of prior convictions. 
The accused, who has a "record" but who thinks he 
has a defense to the present charge, is thus placed in 
a grievous dilemma. If he stays off the stand, his 
silence alone will prompt the jury to believe him guilty. 
If he elects to testify, his "record" becomes prov3ble to 
impeach him, and this again is likely to doom his de-
fense. McCormick, Evidence§ 43, at 99 (3d ed. 1984). 
The solution to this dilemma, according to Luck, is to 
recognize the trial court's discretion to exclude evidence 
of prior convictions. Only if the probative value of the 
prior conviction outweighs the unfair prejudice to the 
defendant is the evidence admissible. A leading case is 
Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir 1967), 
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029,88 S.Ct. 1421,20 L.Ed.2d 287 
(1968). Gordon specified five factors which are to be 
considered in determining admissibility. 
First, the nature of the offense: A prior conviction that 
bears upon veracity has high probative value. In contrast, 
conviction of a crime of violence has little probative 
value. Convictions involving crimes of dishonesty or false 
statement, however, are governed by Rule 609(A)(2). 
Second, the remoteness of the conviction: A one-year 
old conviction is more probative than an eight-year old 
conviction. Convictions more than ten years old, however, 
are _subject to the special limitations of Rule 609(B). 
Third, the similarity between the prior offense and the 
charged offense: If a defendant is charged with a narcot-
ics offense, evidence of a prior narcotics conviction is 
more prejudicial than evidence of a prior larceny convic-
tion. The jury is more likely to use the prior narcotics 
conviction as evidence of character to commit narcotics 
offenses rather than as evidence of untruthful character. 
Fourth, the importance of and need tor the defendant's 
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testimony: If the defendant is the only person who can 
provide defense evidence, the need for his testimony is 
greater, and the argument for exclusion of the prior 
conviction is stronger. 
Fifth, the importance or centrality of credibility in the 
case: For example, if the case boils down to a "swearing 
contest," it is more important for the jury to know of any 
evidence affecting credibility, and the argument for 
admission of the prior conviction is greater. See 3 
Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 316 (1979); 3 
Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence~ 609[03] (1987). 
Crimes of dishonesty and false statement 
Rule 609(A)(2) provides that evidence of prior convic-
tions involving crimes of dishonesty and false statement 
is admissible for impeachment. Convictions falling into 
this category are automatically admissible; the trial court 
has no discretion to exclude these convictions. The 
Conference Report on Federal Rule 609 contains the 
following comment: "The admission of prior convictions 
involving dishonesty and false statement is not within the 
discretion of the Court. Such convictions are peculiarly 
probative of credibility and, under this rule, are always to 
be admitted." H.R. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Gong. 2d Sess, 
reprinted in [1974) U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. News 7098, 
7103. See United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 279 (5th 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 985, 101 S.Ct. 403, 66 
L.Ed.2d 248 (1980). 
The principal issue in applying this rule is determining 
what types of crimes involve "dishonesty" and "false 
statement." The Conference Report also contains a 
comment on this issue: 
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement" the 
Conference means crimes such as perjury or suborna-
tion of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embez-
zlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the 
nature of crimen falsi, the commission of which 
involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or 
falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to 
testify truthfully. /d. 
In addition to the crimes enumerated above, a forgery 
conviction would be admissible under Rule 609(A)(2). 
State v. Taliaferro, 2 Ohio App.3d 405, 2 O.B.R. 481, 442 
N.E.2d 481 (Franklin 1981). On the other hand, crimes 
involving violence and controlled substances are not 
generally encompassed by the rule. See State v. Ellis, 8 
Ohio App.3d 27, 8 O.B.R. 29, 455 N.E.2d 1025 (Franklin 
1982) (misdemeanor assault conviction inadmissible). 
Several Ohio cases mention the term crimen falsi. See 
Webb v. State, 29 Ohio St. 351, 358 (1876) (crimen falsi 
includes "forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, and 
offenses affecting the public administration of justice."); 
State v. Hickman, 102 Ohio App. 78, 83, 141 N.E.2d 202 
(Erie 1956) ("In the common law, the term, 'crimen falsi,' 
contains the elements of falsehood and fraud."). In 
discussing that term in Kornreich v. Industrial Fire Insur-
ance Co, 132 Ohio St. 78, 5 N.E.2d 153 (1936), the 
Supreme Court remarked: "The nature of the offense of 
assault and battery in no wise reflects upon credibility." 
/d. at 90. 
Although theft offenses are typically thought to involve 
dishonesty, it is not clear, in light of the legislative history 
of the rule, whether evidence of such offenses is admissible 
under this provision. See 3 Louisell & Mueller, Federal 
Evioerrce§-317;-af336=i!Z(1979};·3·weinsrein &Berger, 
Weirist~fn's E:videnc(l ,609[03) (1987). Several federal 
courts have adopted a restrictive vi~wof the term 
"dishonesfy.''S.Eie United States v. Grandmont, 680 F.2d 
867, ~71 (ist.Qir, J~~~HriJ!Jbery is nota crime of dishonesty 
absent a showing thatflie crime was committed by 
deceitful or.Jraudul~ntmeans); United States v. Glenn, 
667 F.2d 1269,· 1273 (9thCir. 1982) (crimes of violence, 
theft or stealth do not involve dishonesty or false state-
ment unlesspommitted by fraudulent ordeceitful means). 
In contrast, several Ohio courts have interpreted this 
provision to.permitiJ]Jpeachment vvitb~rnl~.de,meanor 
convictions for petty theft. State v. Tolliver, 33 Ohio 
App.3d 110, 514 N.E:.2d~?2 ((3uernsey 1986); Middleburg 
Heights v~ Theiss, 28Qhio App.3d 1, 5, 28 O.B.R. 9, 501 
N.E.2d 1226{Cuyaflogaj985); Stafe v. Johnson, 10 Ohio 
App.3d 14, 14~16, 10 O.B.R. 20,460 N.E.2d 625 (Franklin 
1983); State v. Taliaferro, 2 Ohio App.3d 405, 2 O.B.R. 
481, 442 N.E.2d 481 (Franklin 1981}. 
Time limit 
Rule 609(B)provides that evidence of a prior convic-
tion that satisfies the criteria of Rule 609{A) is neverthe-
less inadmissible if rnore than ten years has elapsed 
since the date of(1) conviction, (2) r~lea~€l from confine-
ment, or (3)termination of probation, shock probation, 
parole, or shock parole, "whichever is the later date.'' The 
rule, however, does recognize an exception. Such convic-
tions may be admissible if the proponent provides suffi-
cient!ldVCince written fiOtice tothe adverse party and the 
court determines, based upon "specific facts and circum-
stances,'' th~t the probative value of the evidence 
sul;>stantilil._ll~iPY.twejgh~itspreju,dicial ettect. See Annat., 
43 A.L.R. Fed. 398 (1979). 
The ten,year.Jimitation·representsachange in Ohio 
law. The rafiollale for this limitation is that convictions so 
remote in time are no longer relevant in assessing a 
witness' credibility. 
The rule differs from Federal Rule 609(b) to the extent 
that computation of the time limit may be based on pro-
bation or parole termination dates in addition to the date 
of conviction or release from confinement. The time peri-
od coinrnences at whichever date occurs last. The termi-
nation of parole and probation are gqvernecl by statu~e. 
See RC 295l.O( (probC1tion); RC 2947.061 (shock proba-
tion); RC 2967.16 (parole); RC 2967.31 (shock parole). 
The·pointatwhich the·time period ends--:date of 
indictment, date of trial, or date witness testifies-is 
unclear. See 3 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 
320, at 353,(1Q7~).1n State v. Chambers, 2:1 Ohio App.3d 
99, 21 O.B.R. 106, 486 N.E.2d 1163 (Cuyahoga 1984), the 
court wrote: '[T)he time limit would apply to the date upon 
which the witness testifies." /d. at 100. 
The exception 
The exception that grants authority to the trial court to 
admit convictions that are more than ten years old was 
added to Federal Rule 609(b) by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee: 
Although convictions over ten years old generally do 
not have much probative value, there may be excep-
tional circumstances under which the conviction 
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substantially bears on the credibility of the witness. 
* * * 
It is intended that convictions over 10 years old will 
be admitted very rarely and only in exceptional circum-
stances. The rules provide that the decision be 
supported by specific facts and circumstances thus 
requiring the court to make specific findings on the 
record as to the particular facts and circumstances it 
has considered in determining that the probative value 
of the conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial 
impact. S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Gong. 2d Sess., reprint-
_gg'jnJl~Z41 lJ.q~ (:;od~J~ong. & Ad. News 7051, 7061, 
7062 (emphasis added). 
See also State v. Ellis, 8 Ohio App.3d 27, 29,8 O.B.R. 29, 
455 N.E.2d 1025 (Franklin 1982) (record does not 
support a finding under Evid. R. 609(8)). 
The notice requirement was added to the federal rule 
by the Conference Committee. That Committee provided 
the following explanation: "The Conferees anticipate that 
a written notice, in order to give the adversary a fair op-
portunity to contest the use of the evidence, will ordin-
arily include such information as the date of the conviction, 
the jurisdiction, and the offense or statute involved. In 
order to eliminate the possibility that the flexibility of this 
provision may impair the ability of a party-opponent to 
prepare for trial, the Conferees intend that the notice 
provision operate to avoid surprise." H.R. Rep. No. 1597, 
93d Gong. 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974) U.S. Code Gong. 
& Ad. News 7098,7103. 
Method of proving prior convictions 
Prior convictions that are admissible under Rule 609 
may be elicited from the witness on cross-examination or 
established by public record during cross-examination. 
According to State v. Hewit, 26 Ohio App.3d 72,26 O.B.R. 
246, 498N.E.2d 215 (Shelby 1985), the record of convic-
tion also may be admitted during the state's rebuttal. 
Cross-examination 
Permitting cross-examination of a witness concerning 
a prior conviction is consistent with pre-Rules cases. In 
State v. Arrington, 42 Ohio St.2d 114,326 N.E.2d 667 
(1975), the Supreme Court stated: "[T]he general rule 
established by a line of unanimous decisions of this court 
is that the defendant may be cross-examined as to his 
conviction of a crime under state or federal laws for the 
purpose of testing credibility." /d. at 120. Accord, State v. 
Kaiser, 56 Ohio St.2d 29,381 N.E.2d 633 (1978). 
Although the rule does not specify the amount of detail 
concerning the prior conviction that may be elicited on 
cross-examination, the "generally prevailing" practice is 
that "the name of the crime, the time and place of convic-
tion, and the punishment" is admissible, but "details 
such as the name of the victim and the aggravating 
circumstances" are not. McCormick, Evidence § 43, at 
98 (3d ed. 1984). The Supreme Court has written: 
We therefore hold that under Evid. R. 609, a trial court 
has broad discretion to limit any questioning of a 
witness on cross-examination which asks more than 
the name of the crime, the time and place of conviction 
and the punishment imposed, when the conviction is 
admissible solely to impeach general credibility. State 
v. Amburgey, 33 Ohio St.3d 115, 117, 515 N.E.2d 925 
(1987). 
See also State v. Shields, 15 Ohio App.3d 112, 113, 15 
O.B.R. 202,472 N.E.2d 1110 (Cuyahoga 1984); State v. 
Fricke, 13 Ohio App.3d 331, 333, 13 O.B.R. 409, 469 
~. N.E.2d 1035 (Hamilton 1984); State v. Hill, 111 Ohio App. 
257,259, 165 N.E.2d 241 (Hamilton 1959). 
The rule uses the term "cross-examination." This 
provision, however, must be read in conjunction with 
Rule 607, which permits a party to impeach its own 
witnesses. Thus, it is proper to elicit prior conviction 
evidence during direct examination. Moreover, the rule 
should not be interpreted as barring counsel from bring-
ing out evidence of prior convictions on direct examina-
tion "for the purpose of lessening the import of these 
convictions upon the jury." State v. Peoples, 28 Ohio 
App.2d 162, 168, 275 N.E.2d 626 (Mahoning 1971). 
The questioning of a criminal defendant about prior 
convictions in the absence of proof of such convictions 
has been condemned. See State v. Cox, 42 Ohio St.2d 
200, 207, 327 N.E.2d 639 (1975) (prejudicial error toques-
tion defendant "regarding prior convictions, without at 
some point in the trial offering proof thereof."); State v. 
Crawford, 17 Ohio App.2d 141,244 N.E.2d 774 (Hamilton 
1969); State v. Cole, 107 Ohio App. 444, 155 N.E.2d 507 
(Hamilton 1958). The leading case is Wagner v. State, 115 
Ohio St. 136, 152 N.E. 28 (1926), in which the Supreme 
Court commented: 
It is evident that the state had no information concern-
ing any such convictions. Manifestly these questions 
were asked for the sole purpose of discrediting Wagn-
er before the jury ... When the state has no such 
further evidence, or produces none, then questions of 
his character become incompetent for any purpose, 
and, when counsel for the state knows that no convic-
tions attended the indictments inquired about, then 
this line of cross-examination is wholly unfair, and is 
highly prejudicial to the accused. !d. at 137. 
Record of conviction 
The pre-Rules cases recognized that records of prior 
conviction are admissible. In Harper v. State, 106 Ohio 
St. 481, 140 N.E. 364 (1922), the Supreme Court held 
that if "the defendant denies his conviction of such 
crime, the proper record of the conviction, duly authenti-
cated, may be offered by the state in rebuttal." /d. (sylla-
bus, para. 3). Although Rule 609 does not require a prior 
denial as a prerequisite for admissibility of conviction 
records, it does limit the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence to records of conviction. This is consistent with 
McCormick's view. "Here the cross-examiner need not 
'lay a foundation' for proof by copy or record, nor is he 
bound to 'take the answer' if the witness denies the 
conviction, but may prove it by the record." McCormick, 
Evidence§ 43 at 97 (3d ed. 1984). 
A hearsay exception for judgments of previous convic-
tions is recognized in Rule 803(21). A record of a prior con-
viction also would qualify as a public record under Rule 
803(8) (hearsay exception), is often self-authenticating 
under Rule 902, and copies are admissible under Rule 1005 
(best evidence rule). In addition, RC 2945.75(8) provides: 
Whenever in any case it is necessary to prove a prior 
conviction, a certified copy of the entry of judgment in 
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such prior conviction together with evidence sufficient 
to identify the defendant named in the entry as the 
offender in the case at bar, is sufficient to prove such 
prior conviction. 
Witness' explanation 
The rule does not specify whether a witness 
impeached with a prior conviction may offer some type of 
explanatory comment. McCormick recognized that a 
"substantial number of courts, while not opening the 
door to a retrial of the conviction, do permit the witness 
himself to make a brief and general statement in explana-
tion, mitigation, or denial of guilt, or recognize a discre-
tion in the trial judge to permit it." McCormick, Evidence 
§ 43, at 99 (3d ed. 1984). 
In Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481, 140 N.E. 364 
(1922), the Supreme Court may have rejected this view. 
"Such record [of conviction], unmodified or unreversed, 
may neither be impeached nor contradicted by the 
defendant, or any other witness in his behalf." /d. (sylla-
bus, para. 4). However, in State v. Kirkland, 18 Ohio 
App.3d 1, 18 O.B.R. 25,480 N.E.2d 85 (Cuyahoga 1984), 
the court wrote: 
The rule itself does not specify whether a witness may 
offer explanatory comment. See P. Giannelli, Ohio 
Rules (1982) .... However, the admission of any 
collateral evidence which relates to the credibility of a 
witness' testimony lies within the discretion of the trial 
court ... We reject the rigidity of Harper v. State./d. at 4. 
Effect of pardon, annulment, or expungement 
Rule 609(C) provides that evidence of a prior convic-
tion is inadmissible if the conviction has been the subject 
of a pardon, annulment, expungement, certificate of 
rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a 
"finding of rehabilitation," provided the witness has not 
been convicted of a subsequent crime punishable by 
death or imprisonment in excess of one year. In addition, 
evidence of a prior conviction is inadmissible if the con-
viction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, 
expungement, or other equivalent procedure "based on 
a finding of innocence." See An not, 42 A .L.A. Fed. 942 
(1979). 
The policy underlying this provision is stated in the 
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 609: 
A pardon or its equivalent granted solely for the 
purpose of restoring civil rights lost by virtue of a 
conviction has no relevance to an inquiry into 
character. If, however, the pardon or other proceeding 
is hinged upon a showing of rehabilitation the situation 
is otherwise. The result under the rule is to render the 
conviction inadmissible. The alternative of allowing in 
evidence both the conviction and the rehabilitation 
has not been adopted for reasons of policy, economy 
of time, and difficulties of evaluation. 
Pardons based on innocence have the effect, of 
course, of nullifying the conviction ab initio. 
The House Judiciary Committee added the following 
comment on this provision: "The Committee ... intends 
that the words 'based on a finding of the rehabilitation of 
the person convicted' apply not only to 'certificate of 
rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure', but also to 
'pardon' and 'annulment.'" H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d 
! 
~'; 
Gong. 1~! $e§s. (197_3),,ree!if2ted in [1974] U.S. Code 
Gong. & Ad. News 7075, 7085. 
Except for the addition of the term "expungement," the 
rule is identical to Federal Rule 609(c). This addition was 
made because several Ohio statutes contain expunge-
ment provisions. See RC 2953.31 to 2953.36 (first offenders); 
RC 2151.358 Ouveniles); Comment, Expungement in 
Ohio: Assimilation into Society for the Former Criminal, 8 
Akron L. Rev. 480 (1975). Ohio does not have an annul-
ment or rehabilitation procedure, but the rule recognizes 
such procedures if adopted by other jurisdictions. 
Juvenile adjudications· 
In contrast to the federal rule, Rule 609(0) provides 
that evidence of a juvenile adjudication offered to 
impeach a witness is not admissible "except as provided 
by statute enacted by the General Assembly." This rule 
was amended to its present form in 1980 because the 
drafters considered the question of admissibility of 
juvenile adjudications to be substantive, and therefore 
beyond the Supreme Court's n,.rlernaking authority. See 
Giannelli, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The 
General Assembly, Evidence, and Rufemaking, 29 Case 
W.R. L. Rev. 16, 55 n. 207 (1978). 
RC 2151.358(H) governs the admissibility of juvenile 
adjudications. It provides, in part: 
The disposition of a child under the judgment rendered 
or any evidence given in court is not admissible as 
evidence against the child in any other case or pro-
ceeding in any other court, except that the judgment 
rendered and the disposition of the child may be 
considered by any court only as to the matter of 
sentence or to the granting of probation. 
In Malone v. State, 130 Ohio St. 443, 200 N.E. 473 (1936), 
the Supreme Court inter.preteda.predecessor statute as 
precluding the impeachment use of juvenile adjudica-
tions. "Motivated by a humanitarian impulse, the law 
prohibits the use of Juvenile Court proceedings, or of 
proof developed thereon, against a child in any other 
court to discredit him or to mark him as one possessing a 
criminal history." /d. at 453-54. Accord, Mason v. Klasern-
er, 114 Ohio App. 171, 180 N.E.2d 870 (Franklin 1961). 
See also Beatty v. Riegel, 115 Ohio App. 448, 185 N.E.2d 
555 (Montgomery 1961). 
Rule 609 applies only when a prior conviction is 
offered to impeach a witness by showing character for 
truth and veracity. lfthe evidence is offered for some 
other purpose, the rule does not apply, although the stat-
ute may apply. The courts, however, have recognized 
several exc(3ptions toRC 2151.358. In State v. Cox, 42 
Ohio St.2d 200, 327 N.E.2d 639 (1975), the Supreme 
Court held that the statute could not prevent a criminal 
defendant from impeaching a key government witness. 
Although the General Assembly may enact legislation 
to ·effectuate its policy of protecting the confidentiality 
of juvenile records, such enactment may not impinge 
upon the right of a defendant in a criminal case to pres-
ent all available, relevant and probative evidence 
which is pertinent to a specific and material aspect of 
his defense. /d. at 204. 
The United States Supreme Court reached the same 
result in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 
6 
L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), finding that the exclusion of evidence 
of a prosecution witness' juvenile probationary status 
violated the right of confrontation. It should be noted that 
neither Davis nor Cox involved the use of a juvenile 
adjudication to show untruthful character; in Davis the 
evidence was offered to show bias, and in Cox the 
evidence was offered to show contradiction and probably 
was admissible on the merits as well. Thus, these two 
cases would not have been controlled by Rule 609 in any 
event. See also State v. White, 6 Ohio App.3d 1, 6 O.B.R. 
23, 451 N.E.2d 533 (Cuyahoga 1982) (distinguishing 
Davis and Cox). 
Pendency of appeal 
Rule 609(E) provides that the pendency of an appeal 
does not affect the admissibility of evidence of a prior 
conviction. Evidence that an appeal is pending, however, 
is admissible and may affect the weight accorded to the 
prior conviqtion. 
The rationale for this provision is set forth in the Advi-
sory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 609(e): "The 
presumption of correctness which ought to attend judi-
cial proceedings supports the position that pendency of 
an appeal does not preclude use of a conviction for 
impeachment ... The pendency of an appeal is, howev-
er, a qualifying circumstance properly considerable." 
According to the Staff Note, Rule 609(E) "is in accord 
with prior Ohio law." 
Unconstitutional convictions 
In Loper v. Beta, 405 U.S. 473, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 31 
L.Ed.2d 374 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
impeachment use of a conviction based upon a trial in 
which the defendant was denied the right to counsel 
violates due process. The right to counsel violation in 
Loper was based upon Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The Gideon prin-
ciple was extended subsequently to any criminal trial in 
which imprisonment is imposed. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 
367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979); Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006,32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972). 
See also Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 
64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980). Once the validity of a prior convic-
tion is raised, the prosecution has the burden of estab-
lishing that the right to counsel requirements were met. 
See United States v. Lewis, 486 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1973). 
See generally 3 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 
324 (1979); 3 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 
~609[11] (1987). 
Indictments and arrests 
Evidence that a witness has been arrested or indicted 
may not be used to impeach if the evidence is offered 
only to show the witness' bad character. The conduct that 
is the basis for the arrest or indictment, however, may be 
admissible pursuant to Rule 608(B). Moreover, the 
evidence may be admissible if the impeachment is 
based on bias. State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St.2d 167, 249 
N.E.2d 912 (1969); Keveney v. State, 109 Ohio St. 64, 141 
N.E. 845 (1923). 
SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT 
Rule 608(B) provides that on cross-examination a 
witness may be asked, subject to the trial court's 
discretion, about specific instances of conduct which are 
clearly probative of the witness' character for truthful-
ness. Extrinsic evidence of such conduct, however, may 
:c not be admitted; for example, the testimony of other 
:-·. witnesses who may have observed the conduct is 
inadmissible even if the witness denies the conduct on 
cross-examination. "[l]f the answers received on cross-
examination do not satisfy the examiner, it is said that the 
examiner is bound by or 'stuck' with the responses." 
State v. Leuin, 11 Ohio St.3d 172,174, 11 O.B.R. 486, 464 
N.E.2d 552 (1984). See also State v. Kamel, 12 Ohio St.3d 
306,310-11, 12Q.B.R. 378,466 N.E.2d 860 (1984) (error 
to admit extrinsic evidence). 
Whether the pre-Rules cases permitted this type of 
impeachment is unclear. The Staff Note to Rule 608(B) 
cites State v: Browning, 98 Ohio App. 8, 128 N.E.2d 173 
(Hamilton 1954), to support its contention that the rule is 
consistent with prior Ohio law. Several other cases also 
support this contention. See State v. Osborne, 50 Ohio 
St.2d 211, 218,364 N.E.2d 216 (1977), vacated on other 
grounds, 438 U.S. 911,98 S.Ct. 3137, 57 L.Ed.2d 1157 
(1978} (''Appellant's admission that ... he lied to the 
police is singularly relevant and admissible as bearing 
upon his credibility."); Fawick Airflex Co. v. United 
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, 56 
Abs. 419, 421, 92 N.E.2d 431 (App. Cuyahoga 1950) 
("[A] witness on cross-examination may be asked 
questions tending to disclose his own character and may 
be interrogated on specific acts ... if they have a 
legitimate bearing upon his credit as a witness."). Other 
, cases, however, reached the opposite result. See State v. 
' Schecter [Schechter), 47 Ohio App.2d 113, 121, 352 
N.E.2d 617 (Cuyahoga 1974), affirmed by 44 Ohio St.2d 
188,339 N.E.2d 654 (1975) ("A witness can never be 
irhpeacliedthrough evidence of specific instances of bad 
character whether related to truthfulness or otherwise."); 
Brice v. Samuels, 59 Ohio App. 9, 14, 17 N.E.2d 280 
(Hamilton 1938) ("[W]e know of no rule under which 
specific acts of wrongdoing may be admitted to affect the 
credibility of a witness:'). 
Rule 608(B) is not a bar to admissibility if evidence is 
relevant for some purpose other than character. In 
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 
L.Ed.2d 450 (1984), the prosecution offered extrinsic 
evidence showing that the defendant and a defense 
witness were members of a secret prison gang which 
had a creed requiring its members to deny its existence 
and lie for each other. The defendant argued, inter alia, 
that the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 608(b) 
because it was not sufficiently probative of truthfulness 
and was introduced by extrinsic evidence, i.e., through 
the testimony of a prosecution witness. Without deciding 
whether the evidence satisfied the requirements of 
Rule 608(b), the Court held the evidence admissible for 
the purpose of impeachment by bias. According to the 
Court, "there is no rule of evidence which provides that 
testimony admissible for one purpose and inadmissible 
for another purpose is thereby rendered inadmissible; 
quite the contrary is the case." /d. at 56. See also 
State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St.3d 33, 21 O.B.R. 320, 487 




. The admissibility of evidence pursuant to Rule 608(B) 
IS entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. This 
approach represents a compromise between permitting 
a wide-ranging inquiry into specific instances of conduct 
and permitting no inquiry whatsoever. According to 
McCormick, the "latter view is arguably the fairest and 
most expedient practice because of the dangers other-
wise of prejudice (particularly if the witness is a party), of 
distraction and confusion, of abuse by the asking of un-
founded questions, and of the difficulties ... of ascer-
taining whether particular acts relate to character for 
truthfulness:' McCormick, Evidence § 42, at 90-91 (3d 
ed. 1984}. 
Although the rule permits the use of specific instances 
of conduct to impeach, the problems recognized by 
McCormick and the language of the rule suggest that a 
strong showing must be made before admissibility is 
warranted. As the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal 
Rule 608 indicates, the trial court's decision to admit 
such evidence is governed generally by Rule 403. "[T)he 
overriding protection of Rule 403 requires that probative 
value not be outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, and that of 
Rule 611 bars harassment and undue embarrassment." 
In this context, however, Rule 403 must be read in light of 
Rule 608, which imposes tighter restraints on admissibili-
ty. Only evidence relevant to truth and veracity is admis-
sible. In addition, unlike Rule 403, Rule 608 requires the 
evidence to be "clearly" probative. The word "clearly" 
does not appear in the federal version of Rule 608, 
although it did appear in the revised draft of the Federal 
Rules. See 51 F.R.D. 389 (1971). The word "clearly" was 
inserted in the Ohio rule in order to require "a high 
degree of probative value of instances of prior conduct as 
to truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness." Staff Note. 
Wigmore favored limiting admissibility to "only such 
misconduct as indicates a Jack of veracity-fraud, 
forgery, perjury, and the like." 3A Wigmore, Evidence§ 
983, at 840 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). A number of pre-
Rules Ohio cases appear to be consistent with this 
approach. A witness' falsification of an application for a 
marriage license would be admissible under Rule 608. 
See State v. Porter, 14 Ohio St.2d 10, 235 N.E.2d 520 
(1968). An admission by the witness that he lied to the 
police during the investigation of the crime would also 
qualify under Rule 608 because it relates directly to the 
veracity of the witness and because it is undisputed. See 
State v. Osborne, 50 Ohio St.2d 211,218,364 N.E.2d 216 
(1977), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 
3137, 57 L.Ed.2d 1157 (1978}. See also Plas v. Holmes 
Construction Co, 157 Ohio St. 95, 104 N.E.2d 689 (1952}; 
State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E.2d 742 (1949) 
(excluding other acts); Wagner v. State, 115 Ohio St. 136, 
152 N.E. 28 (1926} (excluding evidence of indictments); 
James v. Franks, 15 Ohio App.2d 215, 240 N.E.2d 508 
(Montgomery 1968} (indictments); 3 Louisell & Mueller, 
Federal Evidence§§ 225-34 (1979). 
Cases decided under the Evidence Rules also have 
limited admissibility to conduct relevant to untruthful 
character. See State v. Mann, 19 Ohio St.3d 34, 19 O.B.R. 
28, 482 N.E.2d 592 (1985) (violation of a civil injunction 
not admissible); State v. Rodriquez, 31 Ohio App.3d 174, 
31 QJig-~~~,_ §Q_~J't~~?!!~_!?.?JbQX?l!:1_1!:l§f:l) (evidence of 
p6~~~$~i(:il) of rfii!friji.Jana notadmissible); State v. Tolliver, 
16 Ohio App.3d 120, 16 O.B.R. 126, 474 N.E.2d 642 
(CtJy~IJgg?:JJ~_I:I-4)(gyjg~nce of sex change not admissi-
ble).See Statev. Greer, 39 Ohio St 3d 236, 243 (1988) 
(violation of parole constitutes a specific instance of fail-
ure to keep his word). 
The "remoteness" of the evidence also affects its 
relevancy. As proposed by the U.S. Supreme Court, Rule 
608 required that the evidence "not [be] remote in time." 
56 F. A.D. 201 (1973). Notwithstanding the deletion of this 
phrase from the rule as adopted, remoteness is a factor 
affecting-admissibility,-See State v. Scott, 61 Ohio St2d 
155, 164; 400 N.E.2d 375 (1980) ("[T]he trial court could 
have reasonably concluded that at the time of testimony 
the nine-year qlcl finding W?l3 tq9 remot~ to be relevant."). 
Even if the evidence has a high degree of probative 
8 
value, the trial court must weigh the probative value 
against the accompanying dangers of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of issues, and misleading the jury. It is impor-
tant to note that, unlike Federal Rule 403, Ohio Rule 
403(A) makes exclusion mandatory if the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the accompanying dangers. 
The danger of unfair prejudice is especially acute if the 
defendant in a criminal case is the witness whose credi-
bility is attacked under Rule 608(8). 
Finally, the party inquiring into specific instances of con-
duct must have a good faith basis for asking the question. 
This is especially true in criminal cases where the unfair 
prejudice may be great In Watkins v. Foster, 570 F.2d 501 
(4th Cir. 1978), the Fourth Circuit held that the prosecu-
tion's questions concerning prior bad acts, offered to 
impeach the defendant, violated due process where the 
evidentiary foundation for such questions was insufficient. 
